The esteemed Professor Dr. Hasan-Zadeh has presented a study on why scholars permit people to ask the Imams for help in meeting their needs. I am forwarding it to you; if you have any criticisms of these points, we would be grateful to benefit from your insight.
**Why scholars permit asking the Imams for help in meeting one’s needs:**
1. The first reason is partisanship. They feel that distancing themselves from this deviation would be seen as retreating from Shi‘i principles in the face of the Wahhabis.
2. Another reason is that, in discussions among Wahhabi scholars and our own scholars, asking someone other than God for help in meeting one’s needs has been divided into two categories: polytheistic and permissible. Any act that is not shirk has therefore been deemed permissible. For this reason, Shi‘i scholars have sought to establish that such an act is not shirk, and thus to prove that it is permissible. Yet there is a third category: an act may not be shirk and still be forbidden, as in the case of lying.
Thus, showing that a particular form of seeking intercession is not shirk does not establish that it is permissible. Its being forbidden must also be ruled out. That would require proof that the Lawgiver has authorized this form of seeking intercession—asking someone other than God for help in meeting one’s needs—but no such authorization has been established; rather, it has been prohibited.
3. Another reason is that our scholars have assumed that shirk necessarily involves an intention to act independently, and that if someone asking another than God for help in meeting a need does not intend that person to act independently, no shirk occurs. Yet, first, verse 3 of Surah al-Zumar makes clear that the pagan Arabs of the Hijaz did not intend their idols to act independently when they worshipped them, even though the Qur’an condemns their practice. If the intention to act independently were what made an act shirk, the Qur’an could have told the polytheists, “You may call upon God’s friends to bring you closer to God,” instead of prohibiting, without qualification, calling upon anyone other than God.
Second, in some verses and hadith, the act itself is described as shirk, with no intention to act independently being identified as the criterion. For example, in verses in Surah al-An‘am, making a sacrifice in the name of idols and at their feet is called shirk, without any discussion of the intention behind it.
4. Another reason is that our scholars have not regarded asking someone other than God for help in meeting one’s needs as supplication—and, by extension, as worship. This stems from their definition of supplication: they define it as “asking God.” But in Islam, God’s being the one invoked is a condition for supplication to be valid; Islam has not narrowed the meaning of the word itself. This brings us to the question of *haqiqa shar‘iyya*: did supplication acquire a new meaning in Islam, or did it retain its customary meaning—the meaning it has in the religious traditions—as invocation, with its validity and legitimacy restricted only by the condition that God be the one invoked?
Setting aside the many Qur’anic and hadith proofs that supplication retained its customary meaning in Islam as well—for example, the expression “دعاء الکافرین” in the Qur’an, and the fact that the Qur’an calls the pagans of the Hijaz’s invocation of idols supplication—establishing that supplication acquired a new technical meaning in Islamic law requires evidence; it cannot simply be assumed otherwise.
Therefore, once asking for help in meeting one’s needs is considered supplication and worship, the default ruling is that it is forbidden and impermissible, and its permissibility requires religious proof. But because our scholars have generally not regarded such requests as supplication, they have taken permissibility as the default and have felt no need for religious authorization.
5. Another reason is that our scholars have treated *tawassul* as a single, undifferentiated category, without dividing it into sound and unsound, or permissible and impermissible, forms. Yet tawassul in general is one question, while the permissibility of particular forms is another. Our scholars have not addressed this second question. This is because they have used the phrase from the noble verse, «و ابتغوا الیه الوسیله», as a stock argument for permitting every form of tawassul, overlooking the fact that tawassul is permissible within the framework of tawhid, not beyond it...